Analysis by Former Greek Ministers
The following document, by three former government ministers and current PASOK parliamentarians, was distributed during a tense 6- hour session of the Greek Parliament on 14 November 2002.
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The submittal of the Annan plan puts both Greece and Cyprus in front of crucial and dramatic dilemmas. It is therefore necessary, prior to any other action, to understand and note the main characteristics of the plan and to evaluate the consequences of the process already in progress.
The following are noted among the most essential observations:
The Anan plan is in reality non-negotiable, it is based on the principle of “take it or leave it”, and in actuality becomes absolutely binding if at the beginning of December is cosigned by the two interested parties and Greece and Turkey. Even if the two popular referendums planned for March 30, 2002 turn out negative and the plan itself becomes invalid and nullified, nonetheless dramatic legal consequences will take effect, that is:
Paragraph 3 of the plan’s instructions guide constitutes proof of the fact that the plan is not negotiable and mentions among other things that “given that the two parties both agree to sign the basic treaty of establishment … this will mean that all disputed issues will be resolved before the Copenhagen summit”.
The second round of negotiations will in fact pertain to the finalization and clarification of details and, as the Attorney General of Cyprus A. Markides mentions in his introductory note that will be distributed today to the members of the National Council of Cyprus, “the second round of negotiations cannot fail, because at that point the negotiating parties will be bound to accept the recommendations of the Secretary General”.
Therefore, there is time for negotiations on essential issues only until the beginning of December. It is left to the judgment of each person if such a thing is possible.
All the decisions of the United Nations and the firm position of all the governments of Greece and Cyprus were that a viable solution could only be achieved on the basis of a “bicommunal, bizonal federation”.
The position of Denktash was that “a partnership of equal and sovereign states” must be established.
The provisions of the establishing agreement that we must accept and cosign before the Copenhagen summit, accept all the demands by Denktas, overturn the U.N. decisions and institutionalize the partition that they try to conceal under the cover of a federal system. In actuality it is a loose confederation, if not a union of states such as the unforgettable Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Specifically:
The plan notes “Cyprus has one sovereignty”. But as is also indicated by the Cyprus Attorney General, the term “sovereign rights” refers repeatedly to the rights of the constituent states, that is this sovereignty becomes widespread. In addition, it is stipulated that:
· there will be no hierarchy among the laws of the common state and the constituent states (Article 3, par.2)
· the common state will entrust the implementation of its laws to the authorities of the constituent states (Article 12, par.3)
· the constituent states will have their own flag and national anthem (Article 1 par.4)
· The constituent states (as stipulated by numerous provisions such as Article 16 par. 3, Article 13 par 4 etc) will enter into international agreements and can maintain an international personality and representation.
The powers of the head of state go to a six-member council (4+2) and decisions will have to be taken unanimously. When this is not possible, a decision will be taken by majority vote, but only if there is at least one vote from each constituent state.
Essentially this is a veto right.
Finally, it is notable to mention the
stipulation that for an interim period of 3 years there will be a
co-presidency of those who will sign the agreement with a monthly
rotation of the position among the two.
These two provisions alone would suffice to demonstrate the dangerously minimized functionality of the system.
The residence of all the settlers is legalized or can be legalized with additional provisions (Addendum 4). That is:
Even if we accept that the Annan plan can constitute a basis for negotiations, then there is an urgent and immediate need to remove the especially tight deadlines. Otherwise, we should have the courage to confess that we give into an ultimatum.
T. Pangalos, G. Arsenis, G. Kapsis
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