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Newly released
British Documents for the year 1974 at the Public Records Office.
The British
Government gives tacit clearance to Turkey to proceed with invasion
and agrees to
blockade the Greeks from helping Cyprus.
Following the coup in
Cyprus Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit visited London for negotiations
with the British Government.
According to the record
of conversation on July 17, 1974, between the then Prime Minister Harold
Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary James Callaghan and Mr.
Ecevit the latter bluntly asked for the British Government's cooperation to
invade Cyprus through the British Sovereign Bases.
Ecevit clearly stated
at the time that such the objective of the operation would be to restore
the constitutional order overthrown by the coup of the Greek junta that
forced President Makarios to flee the island.
Although the British
Government refused to join Turkey in such an operation they promised Ecevit
to 'help' by agreeing to prevent Greece from sending assistance to Cyprus.
However, the revealing factor in this case is the concealed intention of
Turkey to invade and occupy the whole of the island if one considers the
location of the British Bases in Cyprus.
The relevant extracts
are as follows:
Mr Ecevit, beginning
the discussion at the dinner table, said that the events in Cyprus amounted
to no ordinary coup d’ etat but constituted a violation of international
treaties.
Britain and Turkey, jointly
or separately, should state that they did not recognise the new regime and
that the old administration must be restored. If Makarios could not return,
the Constitutional provisions should apply. As the two guarantors under the
1960 Treaty Britain and Turkey and the United States should warn Greece of
the violation of the independence of Cyprus which had taken place, and
should ask for the withdrawal of Greek forces under effective UN
supervision. There should also be international agreement about effective
control in the situation thereafter.
"...There should
also be sanctions: a more effective Turkish presence on the island was
essential, and Turkey wished to bring this about in co-operation with the
British Government as the other guarantor, in order to safeguard both
communities. The Turkish Government did not wish to exploit the situation
in Cyprus, not did they wish to act alone and create anxieties thereby. The
British Government was in a position to help Turkey to achieve this result,
and to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey. This
could be done by allowing Turkey to send her forces to Cyprus through the
British SBAs. He felt that this was a historic moment to use the bases to
ensure the independence of Cyprus. Everyone, including the United States
and the Soviet Union, would welcome such action which would justify the
British military presence. He felt that action of this kind, coupled with a
joint statement of British and Turkish objectives, would be a relief to the
whole population of Cyprus and also to the population of Greece...The
alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he felt would be
inevitable later if not sooner - later would be worse and bloodier. If
Britain were prepared to accept action on these lines, the Turkish
authorities would be careful to avoid any embarrassment, by agreement on
the deployment of Turkish forces...".
"...The Prime
Minister said that he thought that he understood the meaning of Mr.
Ecevit's remarks. If the situation of the Turkish community on the island,
deteriorated, Turkey would feel it necessary to intervene. But he did not
think that the SBAs could be used for that kind of intervention. Mr. Ecevit
replied that he could not insist on the point. The bases were not essential
for his purpose...The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr. Ecevit's
remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not
blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would
blockade the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible...".
Wilson rejects
Caramanlis peace offer
Britain turns down
Constantine Caramanlis in line with promise given to Ecevit
After the restoration
of democracy in Greece the new Prime Minister K. Karamanlis asked Britain
to intervene militarily and to condemn publicly the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus.
The released documents
reveal that the British Government had no intention of going as far as a
public statement condemning the Turks and that it was still necessary for
them to maintain a degree of even-handidness. On the 28 July 1974 a
suggested text of reply from Prime Minister Wilson to Karamanlis was
prepared which included the following: " You refer to our right and
our power to intervene in order to prevent the generalisation of the
conflict. If I am right in interpreting this as a suggestion that HMG
should use military force I am bound to say that I cannot believe that this
would do otherwise than exacerbate and complicate the situation...I am sure
you will agree there can be no question of unilateral British military
intervention under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution No.353,
which we have all accepted. In the light of your message, I am sending a
personal appeal to Mr. Ecevit to ensure that violations of the ceasefire
are effectively brought to an end. I am sure that I can look to you to do
the same.".
On the 16 August 1974
the Foreign Office informed the Private Secretary at No.10 Downing Street
that together with the Americans they had warned the Karamanlis Government
that they would not support any Greek military assistance to Cyprus. The
Foreign Office document relating to the relevant message given to Mr.
Karamanlis reads as follows:
"...There is a
real risk that the Greeks will try to send a division by convoy from Crete
to Cyprus. We and the Americans have told them that we would not support
such action and would not be prepared to guarantee them air protection
against the Turkish air force..."
The Turkish Air Force
sunk their own destroyer
According to a progress
report prepared for the Prime Minister, and whilst the Geneva Conference
opened, the Turks were continuing to fan out from Kyrenia, particularly
towards the South East. Turkish ships were still arriving in the port but
they seemed to contain supplies rather than troop reinforcements. The
British estimated that the Turks had by then 10,000 men, 44 tanks and 88
helicopters in Cyprus - they were the strongest land force there. The British
in Cyprus were monitoring every movement and knew everything in full
detail. The note to the Prime Minister said: "...the Turks are
sensitive about our continuing reconnaissance flights over Kyrenia, but we
have a legal right to conduct these and have told them so. Meanwhile,
Ecevit has thanked us warmly for rescuing 72 Turks from the sea, who were
part of the complement of a Turkish destroyer sunk by the Turkish Air
Force."
HMS Hermes and company
HMS Hermes with 41 Commando
Group embarked was warned off for operations in Cyprus at approximately
2215 16 July 1974. 41 Commando's Advance Party landed in Dhekelia at 1600
20 July 1974. The unit was given the task of securing the ESBA and
receiving refugees.
According to various
maps in recently released files HMS Hermes was not the only military ship
cruising around Cyprus at the time of the Turkish invasion but one of many
that actually had Cyprus 'under siege'. The position of some was only known
to the United Kingdom and United States Governments.
Callaghan was
informed in advance of the second invasion
Foreign Secretary James
Callaghan whilst in Geneva was fully informed of the Turkish intentions and
mounting preparations for the second invasion. On the 26 July the British
Ambassador in Ankara alerted Callaghan for the preparation. On the10 August
Air Vice Marshall F. R. L. Mellersh informed Callaghan of the likely
Turkish plans. " Military aspects of the present situation - Likely
Turkish plans. 1. The Turkish army is looking for an excuse to continue
operations. The likely objective is to increase the size of their area to
take in the entire East of Cyprus, bounded by a line from five miles east
of Morphou, through southern suburbs of Nicosia and along the old Famagusta
road to Famagusta. They consider that to achieve this they would launch a
ground attack from their present position in the West and in Nicosia,
combined with a parachute landing by two battalions in the Chatos enclave
and possibly a beach landing in the northern of Famagusta Bay...".
Callaghan in Geneva
sought to extract acceptance of geographical federation
Therefore, and although
Callaghan knew full well that the Turks in Geneva had no genuine intentions
of reaching an agreement, he was working earnestly towards extracting as
many concessions as he could from the Greek and Greek Cypriot side on behalf
of the Turks. Primarily their acceptance to the principle of geographical
federation. Flash telegram from UK Mission in Geneva to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office dated 12 August read: "... The Turkish Government
have tabled ambitious proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone
covering 34% per cent of the island and have demanded a constructive reply
by midnight. There is evidence, that, unless they receive such a reply,
they will walk out of the Geneva conference and take military action in
Cyprus early tomorrow morning. Slight prospect of a compromise and we are
working on Clerides to table a counter draft which would at least concede
the principle of geographical separation..."
On the 13 August
Callaghan sent the following telegram to London. It read: " This
morning Clerides handed Denktash a counter-proposal which, while it
conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages, excluded
the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. I told
Clerides and Mavros that this would not, in my judgement, satisfy the
Turks. They had to face the reality that there would be no United States
military pressure, that UNFICYP would not oppose the Turkish forces and
that, as a result, there was no prospect of external help against Turkish
aggression. I urged them to produce a counter-proposal which at least
conceded the principle of geographical separation. Clerides said that he
could not do so from Geneva: Greek Cypriot opinion was not ready and
Makarios, with whom he spoke yesterday, would certainly disavow it. They
agreed to fly to Athens and Nicosia to discuss the principle with their
colleagues and to return tomorrow night a clear answer..."
However, as Callaghan
knew very well, the Turks were not interested in agreeing to anything. They
intended to attack and occupy more territory leaving the negotiating for
later...
Draft Agreement
On the 13 August
Callaghan read to Gl. Clerides and G. Mavros a draft agreement he had
prepared for signature by Clerides and Denktash in the event of compromise.
His draft referred to a fundamental revision of the constitutional
structure of the Republic of Cyprus, to a federal government with a
bi-communal nature of two autonomous administrations operating in
appropriately defined geographical areas.
R. Denktash surprised
them by producing his own proposal for a clear bizonal bicommunal
federation.
According to the
British released documents Turkish Foreign Secretary Gunes' plan for six
cantons presented at the Geneva conference on the 12 August was the result
of pressure by Dr. H. Kissinger who originally disagreed with the
bi-regional federation, or bi-zonal federation and which London was
promoting together with the Turks. Therefore Denktash's move to follow the
next day 'with his own plan' for bizonal bicommunal federation reflected
much better the real Turkish objectives. The talks broke down on the 14
August followed by the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The geographical
solution of "biregional federation"
On the 16 August 1974
the Foreign Office official Mr. A. C. Goodison, noted the following:
" It is important
that we should avoid any suggestion that in favouring the geographical
separation of the two communities as the most viable solution of the Cyprus
problem, we are working for the partition of the island. Partition has a
bad name internationally. It would also be contrary to our obligations,
both under the 1960 Settlement and as a fellow-member with Cyprus of the
Commonwealth and the United Nations. I recommend that we should use the
term "bioregional federation". We should reserve the term
'cantonal federation' for Mr. Gunes's proposal involving more than one area
for each community..."
The British policy
at 'stage III' (after both Turkish invasions)
Clerides was 'their
man'
On the same day in a
separate note the Foreign Office records the following:
" Building up Mr. Clerides.
The chances of a radical settlement in Cyprus depend on having Clerides
rather than Makarios at Stage III. The Secretary of State has already
embarrassed Makarios by moving him towards stating his terms before we
resume in Geneva' this line could perhaps be developed to Clerides'
benefit. But there is not much we can do about this. The danger of a
declaration of enosis was greatest on 14 August; we should take no
preventive action against this unless we have some indication that it is
contemplated. We do not want to suggest that ideas of this kind are
current, given the assurances of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots at
Geneva. We must also encourage the Greeks to continue to help Clerides by
removing undesirable Greek influences from Cyprus. We must do what we can
to discourage reprisals against the Turkish Cypriot community outside the
Turkish zone... We should stick to the Secretary of State's line that the
Turks have a case even though their methods are regrettable.
Constraining the Turks.
It would suit our strategy if the Turkish armed forces ended up with 25/30
per cent rather than 40 per cent of the island. But they cannot be
negotiated with in their present self-confident mood. We should therefore
do what we can to make them more amenable by stage III. The particularly
difficult problem will be the possible enforced transfer of the Greek
Cypriots from the Turkish occupied zone. In one sense this could facilitate
the bi-regional federal solution; on the other hand it would increase the
danger of reprisals against Turkish Cypriots...".
23 September 1974.
During a meeting between Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and his Greek
counterpart G. Mavros the former said that it was clear that Turkey would
insist on the division of Cyprus into two zones and asked whether the Greek
Government and President Makarios would accept such a solution so long as
there was a central federal Government. Asked (by Mr. Tsounis) as to why
the Archbishop should commit himself at that stage Mr. Callaghan said it
was desirable in order to achieve a sense of realism and to give support to
Mr. Clerides".
Between the period of
September and end of November 1974 the British Government went out of its
way in order to secure support for Mr. Gl. Clerides at the forthcoming Athens
meeting set to take place end of November beginning of December between
Makarios, Karamanlis, Clerides and others. The meeting was crucial for the
pursued policy by London and Clerides. Archbishop Makarios was to be
pressured into giving written consent for Clerides to negotiate on a basis
of geographical federation. Otherwise Clerides threatened with resignation.
The Turks insisted on a public acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of a
solution based on geographical federation.
The 'Argo' speech
And it was in this
context that Gl. Clerides on the 6 November 1974 dared to support publicly
at the 'Argo' gallery in Nicosia the concept of a solution based on
geographical federation. He said in his speech: "... What are the
prospects of a solution to the Cyprus problems through negotiations without
any illusions? First. Any thought that it is now possible for any solution
to emerge on the basis of a unitary state is outside reality because Turkey
would certainly not agree to discuss such a solution. If in the past there
had been a possibility of finding a solution based on a unitary state/local
autonomy for the Turks there is not such a possibility now. Second. Since
the state cannot be unitary, the only solution that can now merge is that
of a federal state. Such a solution can take various forms. It can be a
cantonal solution through the creation of a number of cantons in which the
Turks will be in the majority. This will be the best solution for us. The
only solution can also be geographical federation based on two regions
corresponding to the population ratio...".
On the 15 November 1974
James Callaghan sent the following oral message to Clerides.
" I understand
that you will be going to Athens soon for a meeting with Karamanlis and
Makarios. I realise how important this will be for your own political
future and for the future of the Clerides/Denktash talks. I also appreciate
how sensitive an issue the Archbishop's return is and, for your own
information only, I shall be advising the Archbishop to consider postponing
it. I sincerely hope that you will be able to secure the support of
Karamanlis and of the Archbishop for your own pragmatic approach to a long
term solution. You should know that I hope to see the Archbishop on 21
November and that, if Karamanlis is successful in the lections, we shall be
sending a message to him, stressing the importance we both attach to giving
support and substance to your talks with Denktash. I greatly welcomed your
recent observation that some form of geographical federation is inevitable.
As you know, my own firm conviction is that the Turks will insist on a
bi-regional geographical solution. While I fully appreciate the difficulty
about accepting this publicly, I am sure that you are right at the very
least not to exclude it...We shall be doing our best to impress this on
Archbishop Makarios...".
Glafkos Clerides
according to numerous British documents was an ardent supporter of the
bi-zonal federation from the early stages knowing full well that that was
the desired Turkish goal. That was the reason the British Government was
standing by him and doing everything possible in terms of influence and
persuasion to secure the Archbishop's agreement. Such an agreement would
give Clerides a free hand to proceed on the desired basis.
The following extract
from a telegram sent to FCO by the British High Commissioner in Nicosia is
indicative enough:
" Neither my
American colleague nor I have the slightest indication of any Turkish
wavering on bi-zonal federation as the basis for a Cyprus settlement. This
has been reaffirmed to me recently by both Denktash and the Turkish charge
here. Crawford denies having suggested to Christophides that the Americans
had information to the contrary: He has indeed been doing his best to bring
Christohides round to a realistic acceptance of bi-zonal federation as the
only solution likely to be accepted by the Turks. He has, however, had
discussions with both Christophides and Clerides ( as have I also) about
the possibility of a multi-cantonal variant of bi-zonal federation. This
would not be the functional federalism which I believe the Archbishop to
favour...it would instead be essentially bi-zonal with Turkish retention of
a northern zone stretching notionally from Panagra and Myrtou in the east
to Famagusta in the east...as a negotiating gambit this would, for the
Greeks, have the advantage of softening the stark outlines of bi-zonality,
and it would have a marginally better chance of acceptance by the Turks
than straight functional federalism...I understand that Clerides still
hopes that Makarios can be persuaded by himself and Karamanlis at the
Athens meeting not to return to Cyprus for the present. But if this attempt
fails, as seems likely, Clerides would concentrate on getting the
Archbishop's signature to a formula which might include an agreement that
Clerides should initially negotiate with Denktash for a brief period on the
basis of a multi-cantonal solution, but if this made no progress, should
then be free to switch to a full bi-zonal federation. An essential feature
would be the Archbishop's signed agreement to back a Clerides negotiation
on this basis...A major objective at the present stage must however be to
keep Clerides in play...".
On another telegram
dated 26 November Olver wrote: "... On the form of a settlement,
Clerides agreed that a bi-zonal federation was still the Turkish aim:..He
proposed to work in Athens for a protocol in which this was the first
negotiating gambit, but it was agreed to revert to a bi-zonal solution if
this got nowhere".
Lord Caradon launches
the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and consults the Foreign Office
Early in September 1974
Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon) launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation
and the same day has a meeting with the Foreign Office. They told him that
they believed " the right solution is a bi-regional federal Cyprus. If
we were to come out with this publicly and formally, it would, at this
stage at any rate, risk others (particularly Makarios) stating their
opposition to it equally publicly and formally. Clerides and Denktash both
accept such an approach. It is premature to return to a Geneva-type
conference...to do all we can in terms of quiet diplomacy to facilitate it.
We hope to avoid other initiatives which will distract from it.".
The Kissinger factor
Dr. Kissinger
originally preferred a solution based on the 1960 treaty
According to a telegram
the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan sent to Prime Minister Wilson
from New York, Kissinger (before the invasion) is recorded to support a
constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. It reads as
follows:
" Kissinger
stressed that he did not want to see a resolution to day at all. He was
quite happy to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow at which Makarios could
make a statement. But before any substantive move in the Council he hoped
you would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London perhaps on
Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the
1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support and would join
us in presenting a proposal on which a security council resolution could
then be based. I asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind.
He though we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both
to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon, for instance, Clerides. In
fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson, and ourselves and the
Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice
as they had never trusted him... Kissinger was clearly troubled that we
might be committing ourselves too far without being able to calculate the
longer-term consequences. He asked me to convey these further reflections
to you at once, emphasising his deep concern...".
According to the
British newly released documents a new picture is emerging vis-a-vis the
role of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The documents reveal that contrary to what had
been promoted since 1974 the real driving force behind the events and
policies was indeed the British Government all along and not the Americans.
Dr. Kissinger in many ways followed the British. The documents show
disagreements over the Cyprus issue and particularly the solution. For
instance before the Turkish invasion Kissinger supported a solution based
on the 1960 Treaty but preferred Clerides to Makarios or Sampson. And it
was only after the invasion that he showed preference to cantons but yet
not to bi-zonal federation. The documents reveal that bi-zonal federation
had been accepted by Kissinger on the strong insistence of the British
Government.
On the 16 November 1974
Henry Kissinger wrote a letter to James Callaghan informing him of his talk
with Makarios on the 13th and assured Callaghan that they (USA) supported
the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable. It read:
"...In our
discussion of the future of Cyprus, I told Makarios that in my view any
solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only
a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. He is reluctantly beginning to
accept the idea of a federation, but he insists that there must be a
multiplicity of cantons under a strong central government. I understand
that since our meeting, Makarios has let it be known that the US still
holds open the idea of a multi-cantonal arrangement. I want to assure you
that we support the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable
arrangement and on this I think we are in complete agreement.
The clouds however,
over what actually Kissinger told Makarios did not go away. The British
came to the conclusion that Makarios could not have invented everything.
Another extract from a minute by the South East European Department of the
Foreign Office read as follows:
" There is clearly
some confusion over the views of the American Government. Makarios,
mistakenly or mischievously, believes that Kissinger accepts and indeed
wishes to promote a multi-cantonal solution, and has convinced the Greeks
of this interpretation of the American position. Dr. Kissinger in his
letter of 16 November to the Secretary of State says specifically " I
told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a
geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be
acceptable. However Mr. Ramsbotham's telegram 3729 (British Ambassador in
Washington) of 16 November reporting his conversation with Dr. Kissinger
puts the point a little more ambiguously. For example " he (Dr.
Kissinger) had been careful not to say flatly (to Makarios) that the
bi-regional solution was the preferred American one". We hope to
clarify the American position in a further conversation...".
In Brussels in December
1974 Dr. Kissinger with the consent of the British Government promoted the
restart of political talks between Clerides and Denktash but without preconditions
as to the solution...
The diary of events
15 July 1974 - Military
coup in Cyprus
17 July 1974 -
President Makarios and Mr. Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, arrive
in London. The former is received as President of Cyprus. They both have meetings
with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Callaghan asks Makarios if
he wanted to see B. Ecevit. Makarios declined saying that there were so
many Greek Cypriots in London he preferred to see them. Press reports speak
of massive Turkish Army build-up. According a high NATO official, members
of NATO at a Council meeting voiced 'broad support for the elected regime
of President Makarios and the territorial integrity of the island of
Cyprus.
18 July 1974 -
President Makarios flies to New York to address UN. The Security Council
acknowledges him as President. Mr. Sisco, U.S. under-Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, arrives in London. He meets Mr. Callaghan and Mr.
Ecevit, who later leaves for Ankara. Mr. Kissinger flies to California.
19 July 1974 -
President Makarios speaks to the Security Council alleging the Coup was
organised by the Greek Military Regime,. U.S. ambassador Scali says this is
an issue still to be determined, and warns against a power vacuum in Cyprus
if Greek Officers are permanently removed. The Security Council adjourns
without a decision.
The Turkish fleet sails
from Mersin. Mr. Sisco goes from London to Athens to Ankara.
20 July 1974 - Turkish
invasion of Cyprus. The UN Security Council unanimously calls for a
ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and the
opening of negotiations.
21 July 1974 - Mr.
Kissinger in Washington. Mr. Sisco returns to Athens. Negotiations for a
ceasefire.
22 July 1974 - Turkey
and Greece accept ceasefire from 1400 GMT. After the fall of Kyrenia Mr.
Ecevit is reported as stating it will now remain "forever
Turkish".
23 July 1974 - Collapse
of Junta in Greece. Mr. Constantine Karamanlis is called on to return and
become Prime Minister. Nicos Sampson resigns, Mr. Glafkos Clerides is sworn
in as President.
24 July 1974 - Mr.
Karamanlis is sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece.
25 July 1974 - First
Geneva Conference opens. Turks continue to build-up in Cyprus.
26 July 1974 - Turkish
army continues to advance, captured Bellapais and had doubled area under
its control since the cease fire.
28 July 1974 - Mr.
George Mavros Greek F. Minister states that there was no question of Enosis
and Greek Government requests special meetings of the Security Council and
NATO Council in view of ceasefire violations.
29 July 1974 - Turkish
Commanders ordered UN out of Kyrenia area. Continued reports of landing of
Turkish tanks and troops.
30 July 1974 - Geneva
Declaration signed, reaffirming ceasefire and establishing UN buffer zone.
Ceasefire liens to be identified by 4-man military commission. Second
Geneva Conference called for 8th August to consider constitutional issues.
31 July 1974 - UN
confirms Turkish Army broken Geneva ceasefire by shelling Karavas and
Lapithos.
4 August 1974 - A
Turkish advance continues with daily fighting.
6 August 1974 -
Lapithos, Karavas and Vasilia finally captured. Colonel Chakar, Turkish
member of 4-man commission says that the attack does not violate the
ceasefire because it is "mopping up small pockets of resistance".
8 August 1974 - Second
round of Geneva talks begin.
9 August 1974 -
Agreement on ceasefire lines is signed in Nicosia. At Geneva Turkey demands
regional federation with more territory for Turkish Cypriots up to 34%. More
than the Turkish Army already had captured.
13 August 1974 - Mr.
Ecevit gave 24 hours to Greece to accept the Turkish proposals at Geneva.
14 August 1974 - 0200.
Geneval talks break down. Mr. Callaghan requests meeting of UN and blames
Turkey for not permitting 36 hours adjournment for consultation. 0500 major
attack by Turkish army on a broad front.
15 August 1974 - State
Department spokesman criticizes Turkey for invasion and says US will cut
off arms to both Greece and Turkey if they go to war. Karamanlis announces
Greece will not go to war but is withdrawing from military side of NATO.
16 August 1974 -
Turkish army completes capture of Famagusta, and consolidates along 'Attila
Line'. The British Foreign Office in co-operation with Gl. Clerides starts
its adamant campaign in favour of the Turkish demand for bi-regional
federation i.e. the bi-zonal bi-communal federation.
These are the most
important revelations of the newly released documents. It should be noted
that the most important documents relating to the coup (reports and FCO
minutes) have been carefully retained as well as other documents. Also the
Prime Minister's office was very unusually removing documents from selected
files as late as days before their release.
Cyprus Weekly January 7-13 2005
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