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The most significant event of 1967 in the SE-mediterranean was the
downfall of democracy in Greece and its replacement by a military junta. It
has frequently been alleged that George Papadopoulos, who led the coup, had
been on the CIA pay-roll since 1952 and
had acted as chief liaison officer between the KYP (the Greek subsidiary of
the American CIA) and the USA. The US
administration provided training and material to the anti-constitutional
forces before the coup and became their protector for seven years after.
For Cyprus, however,
the consequences were to prove catastrophic. The emergence of the junta
marked the beginning of a severe deterioration in relations between Athens
and Nicosia, a sad affair that culminated in the military coup against
Makarios in July 1974.
Since the Second World
War, the US had funded an enormous military complex in Greece, and almost
the entire Greek officer corp received US training. Greece was at the hub
of CIA activity for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The
Greek military even named their headquarters in Athens (the Pentagon) as a
gesture of admiration.
Athens was the
switching centre for all communications east and south of Greece, which had
been received from the Middle East and Africa and then relayed to
Washington. As a consequence, it was Washington who wished the Cyprus issue
resolved, especially following the six day Arab-Israeli war, which acted as
a timely reminder of how essential US facilities in Greece and Turkey were
for the defence of Israel, as well as of NATO. The colonels agreed to meet
officials of the Turkish Government, but no solution was found. In Turkey
anti-Greek propaganda was yet again deliberately and cynically fuelled
using protests over the alleged maltreatment of the Muslim minority in
(Greek) Western Thrace. It is significant that the status of the Turkish
Cypriots had improved to such an extent that Turkey was unable to continue
to use this pretext. The enosis issue, however, became the chosen tool of
the junta in its efforts to destabilise the Cypriot Government.
Against this
background, a second major clash occurred in Cyprus on 15 November 1967.
The Turkish Cypriot village of Kophinou is situated in the Larnaca area and
sits on the junction where the road from Larnaca joins the road from
Limassol. If cut, road communications would be disrupted and freedom of
movement would be denied between the South-west and the remainder of the
island. The appointment of a new Turkish officer in January 1967 to head
the Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries heightened tension in the area. Known by
his nom de guerre, Mehmet, a campaign of stopping traffic, altering road
signs and a generally belligerent attitude aimed quite often at the local
UN contingent was adopted by his paramilitaries. It was calculated to
annoy, intimidate, and precipitate all but the Turkish Cypriots.
Turkish paramilitaries
occupied positions on the high ground above Ayios Theodoros, the neighbouring
village to Kophinou. By the Summer of 1967, the Greeks of Ayios Theodoros
began to experience difficulties getting to their part of the village which
could only be reached by travelling through the occupied Turkish sector.
Whilst this was going on, the Greek Cypriot police decided to suspend their
patrols in order to avoid any increase in tension. In September, Mehmet
assaulted a UN major and was relieved of his command. The police then
sought to resume their patrols, but were prevented from doing so by the
Turkish paramilitaries. The tension imported by Mehmet, however, did not
leave with him.
There followed two
months of protracted negotiations in an attempt to restart the patrols
which had taken place since the early 1960s and had only temporarily been
stopped. UNFICYP agreed on the resumption of the patrols, and by mid
October the UN Secretary General himself was becoming impatient at Turkish
prevarication, which was clearly emanating from the Turkish leadership, and
complained bitterly at Turkish Cypriot behaviour. The possibility of
another no go area was unacceptable to the Cypriot Government, especially
in view of the strategic significance of the junction of the
Larnaca-Limassol road.
On 27 October 1967, the
UN Secretary General was therefore driven to make a personal appeal to the
Turkish Government, asking them to co-operate with the UN authorities in
Cyprus in order to restore freedom of movement in the Kophinou area.
However, his pleas were met with an obstinateness and stubbornness that has
characterised Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus ever since. There followed
more prevarication and on 13 November 1967 the UN met with the Cyprus
government, followed on 14 November by two police patrols moving through
the area. They completed their patrol unhindered. The following day,
however, another police patrol following the same route was shot at by
Turkish-Cypriot nationalists.
The National Guard, by
this time joined by Grivas, retaliated, as the Turks knew they would, and
the result was a battle which went on through the night. On 16 March,
inevitably, the National Guard and the police were withdrawn. However, by
then the death toll amounted to 22 Turkish casualties and one Greek. This
event was isolated and did not escalate into island wide violence, as had
been the case in 1963/64. This episode has since been described by Turkish
propagandists as a "genocide" committed against the Turkish
Cypriots. The sad reality is that it had been deliberately instigated by
Turkey, who was by now playing with the lives of the Turkish Cypriots. The
Turkish response was immediate and pre-meditated. Turkish war planes made
sorties over Greek Thrace and troops were concentrated on the Greco-Turkish
border. Yet again, the threat of war and a danger to the cohesion of NATO’s
southern flank emerged.
There followed an
intense period of American shuttle diplomacy by President Lyndon Johnson’s
envoy Cyrus Vance. The outcome was the presentation of a set of stiff
demands on the Greek Junta by the Turkish Government. The result was the
Junta’s agreement to virtually every Turkish demand. The colonels agreed to
withdraw Grivas and all their excess troops who had entered Cyprus.
Significantly, no Turkish troops from the inestimable number who had also
joined the Turkish contingent since 1959 left the island. Any economic
restrictions were also withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves, a gesture not
reciprocated by the Turkish side, who continued to maintain their road
blocades.
The political
repercussions were devastating for the Greek Cypriots. The island was now
virtually undefended and any threat of invasion could only be met by token
resistance. The Turks could see that the Greeks were unable to use their
numerical strength to establish government control over the whole island,
and that Greece was unwilling to risk a war, whatever the outcome. This
assured, the Turkish Cypriots proceeded to declare their "separate
Turkish administration" on 29 December 1967 over those areas under
their control. A few Turkish Cypriot lives had given Turkey the perfect
pretext to begin its incremental annexation of Northern Cyprus.
Although the crisis had
now passed, the relationship between Athens and Nicosia had irrevocably
changed. From this point on the Greek military junta became convinced that
the `Cyprus problem’ could only be solved by eliminating Makarios, because
the price of a settlement with the Turks would inevitably be beyond
anything Makarios would accept. The junta, anxious to appeal to its US
masters, wanted a solution acceptable to Turkey, and this would involve
some form of partition. On 12 January 1968, Makarios declared enosis
officially no longer feasible. The tilt towards the acceptance of
independence as the new reality was now given unambiguous official
approval. Makarios followed this declaration by an election victory, in
which he received 96% of the vote, an increase of 32% over the 1960
election due to communist support.
The political problem
now emerging was how to present an agenda which could deal effectively with
democratic imperative (Cyprus had had a legitimate communist party and a
new socialist party) while making clear Cyprus’s disinterest to the Greek
dictatorship.
Cyprus knew, however,
that it was only a matter of time before Turkey chose to invade and
complete its objectives. The primary function of the officer corp was to
erode the authority of the Cyprus Government, rather than to plan for the
defence of the island against the expected Turkish invasion. Indeed, given
the seven year notice Cyprus had of Turkey’s intention to invade, it is
remarkable that no coherent defence strategy was adopted. The Greek
colonels saw this as the achievement of a common front with its NATO ally
Turkey against communism. Any resistance on the part of the Cypriots to
preserve the unity and territorial integrity of their state was branded
anti-enosist and anti-Hellenist.
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